Accueil > Economics of competition

KAFP 3700 - Economics of Competition

Type d'enseignement : Lecture alone

Semester : Autumn 2017-2018

Number of hours : 24

Language of tuition : English



Course Description

The purpose of the course is to introduce students to the economic analysis of competition policy (or antitrust policy). The main themes presented are cartels, mergers and abuses of dominant positions. The objectives of the course are: - to understand when and why a number of practices represent an infringement of competition - to understand why competition laws exist and the economic rationale for anti-trust intervention. The course appeals to simple industrial organization models and economic intuitions. Students will be requested to prepare a group presentation of a competition policy case.


BIANCINI, Sara (Professeur des universités - Université de Caen)

Pedagogical format

During the first 9 weeks, the instructor will give traditional lectures. The last 3 weeks will be devoted to students' group-presentation, followed by a open class discussion of the case presented.

Course validation

Exam (50% of the grade): written examination, based on the concepts presented during the course. Group presentations (40% of the grade): Groups of 3-4 students will have to present a competition policy case, chosen from a list provided by the instructor (or anyway approved by the teacher). Participation: 10%.


Students are expected to attend classes. They are also required to prepare the group presentation of a competition policy case: this will require a powerpoint (or similar) slide presentation and an oral presentation in front of the class (during one of the last three sessions).

Required reading

  • Motta, M., Competition Policy: Theory and practice, Cambridge University Press (2004).
  • Ivaldi, M., Jullien, B., Rey, P., Seabright, P., & Tirole, J. The Economics of Unilateral Effects. Interim report for DG competition, European Commission (2003).
  • Fabra, N. and Motta, M. (2017) "Assessing Coordinated Effects in Merger Cases" Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, (Corchon and Marini Eds.) Edward Elgar.

Additional required reading

Ivaldi, M., Jullien, B., Rey, P., Seabright, P., & Tirole, J. (2003). The economics of tacit collusion. Interim report for DG competition, European Commission.