Accueil > Microeconomics: information, design and institutions


Type d'enseignement : Lecture and tutorials

Semester : Autumn 2019-2020

Number of hours : 48

Language of tuition : English


Mathematical basics and an introduction to Microeconomic Theory.

Course Description

This is a course in intermediate Microeconomic theory with applications. It studies the design of institutions that optimally cope with fundamental, longstanding economic questions (allocation of private goods, public good provision, trade). Starting from a simple, institution-free description of each question, we try to understand the basic tensions at work, and derive institutions that optimally address these tensions. In the process, we introduce the important ideas of social choice, game theory, and market design. The course is divided into four parts: We first study the basics of Social Choice Theory and Economic Welfare Analysis. Then we look at the issue of strategic interaction of rational players embodied in the discipline of Game Theory. We look at problems arising from the asymmetry of information within Auctions and more general Mechanisms for the the provision of private and public goods. Finally we will investigate how information imperfections affects market outcomes with a focus on monopoly settings and how they endogenously leads to inefficiencies, e.g. due to adverse selection in employment and insurance markets as well as in auctions where the seller aims to maximize revenues.


BEHRINGER, Stefan (PhD. Lecturer)

Pedagogical format

This course consists of lectures and tutorials.

Required reading

  • Mas-Colell, Whinston, Green (1995): Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press
  • Varian (1992):Microeconomic Analysis (3rd ed.), Norton
  • Riley (2012): Essential Microeconomics, Cambridge University Press
  • Fudenberg & Tirole (1991), Game Theory, MIT Press
  • Gibbons (1992): Game Theory for Applied Economists/A primer in Game Theory, Princeton University Press